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ADMINISTRATIVE PRESCRIPTION AND
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES
WALTER GELLHORN*
Legislation authorizing administrators to promulgate rules or to
adjudicate specific cases is commonplace. Rarely do contemporary
courts hear serious argument that the legislature has improperly
transferred its own lawmaking responsibility or that it has, in disregard
of constitutional allocation of functions, given into the hands of
executive officials tasks meant to be performed only by judges. Abstract
doctrine about the distribution of governmental powers has been
reshaped by practical necessities.
To what extent have those same necessities modified the conventional
view that the legislature defines wrongful conduct and its consequences
while the courts determine case-by-case whether the forbidden conduct
has occurred?
Whether or not the power to prescribe conduct and the power to state
the consequences of disobeying the prescription are analytically
different, sensitivity concerning legislative delegation does mount when
administrators become penalizers. At the same time, however, a trend
continues toward empowering administrators to set penalties by rule or
to impose them in individual instances. The efficacy of conventional
penal processes is far from being universally acknowledged. The search
for other means of enforcing desired standards of behavior therefore
remains active. The law is in a somewhat turbulent state of flux between
the traditional and the not yet extensively tested.
1. Legislative Prescription of Criminal Sanctions
I f the legislature authorizes an administrator to adopt regulations and
adds that any violation of his regulations will be a crime, who has
determined what conduct shall be deemed criminal? At the moment of
statutory enactment the substance of the regulations is, of course, not
known, since the administrator has not yet exercised the power about to
be delegated to him. Is the administrator, then, the definer of the penal
offense?
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. This article draws heavily on material embodied
in earlier editions of an administrative law casebook prepared by the author and Professor Clark
Byse of Harvard Law School. The topic discussed here is not included in their ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW -CASES AND COMMENTs (5th ed. 1970).
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Many decades ago, in United States v. Grimaud, the Supreme Court
found this an easy question to answer. There, the statute provided that
violators of the Secretary of Agriculture's rules about using forest
reservations should be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or
imprisonment for not more than twelve months, or both, at the
discretion of the court. Grimaud was prosecuted for ignoring a
regulation the Secretary had promulgated. He sought dismissal of the
charges against him because, he argued, Congress alone had power to
determine what acts would be criminal and, hence, could not
constitutionally delegate to someone else the responsibility of defining
and establishing what would constitute the elements of a crime against
the United States. The Court rejected these arguments: "[T]he authority
to make administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, nor
are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character
because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense. A violation
of . . . [the rules] is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by
Congress. The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty."
This continues to be the generally accepted view: the legislature
decides what is a penal offense, namely, disobeying a rule whose content
may be changed by administrative amendment even after it first becomes
known. "Today," Professor Jaffe believes, "we would probably say
that Congress and the officer together make the crime, the officer acting
within the intelligible limits established by Congress." 2
Very rarely a state court has asserted, in cases resembling United
States v. Grimaud, that the legislature must never delegate to persons
not elected by the People the "precious power" to decide what acts shall
be regarded as criminal. 3 But, of course, this misses the point. The "act"
held in Grimaud's case to be criminal was disregarding the Secretary of
Agriculture's regulation. Congress, not the Secretary, had declared that
act a crime. Certainly, the Supreme Court's view has not wavered a
millemeter during the six decades since Grimaud's case came before it.,
The only doubtful point now perceptible in this general area occurs
1. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
2. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 110 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89,336 P.2d 308 (1959); State v. Maitrcjean, 193 La. 824,
192 So. 361 (1939).
4. See United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957), upholding a prosecution for violating a
federal law that made unlawful the interstate transportation of fish in violation of a state law in the
state from which the fish were to be transported. A Florida statute had made it a crime to violate the
rules of a Florida fish and game commission. This was enough to satisfy the Supreme Court about
state law upon the basis of whichfederal law came into play.
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss3/2
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES
when a legislature is not sure that every violation of every rule (not yet
promulgated, and contents therefore as yet unknown) should be
denominated a crime. May the legislature then delegate to the rulemaker
the power to say that some violations should be regarded seriously
enough to be tagged as penal offenses, while others should be viewed in
some other light?
A negative answer was suggested some years ago by the New York
courts.5 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board had been authorized to
promulgate rules concerning the sale of beer. The statute also provided
that violation of a rule promulgated by the Board would be a
misdemeanor "'if such rule so provides and if such rule shall be
published. . . ." The Board adopted and published a rule prohibiting
the sale of beer to minors. The rule stated that violation would be a
misdemeanor. Grant violated the rule and was convicted of a
misdemeanor. He appealed. The court said that:
The legislature may delegate to administrative agencies power to make
reasonable rules and regulations for administrative purposes and give to
such rules and regulations the force and effect of law. United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). . . .It may declare the violation of these
rules to be a crime and provide the punishment for their violation. In so
doing it is exercising the legislative power committed to its discretion by
the People through the Constitution.9
But although the legislature may delegate power to make rules and
regulations and give them the force and effect of law,
tlt may not delegate the power to create crimes and prescribe the
penalties therefor. The declaration of the crime and the prescription of the
penalty for the violation rest in the ultimate discretion of the
Legislature. . . .Here the Legislature has delegated to an administrative
board the power to make rules and declares that a violation thereof shall
be a misdemeanor 'if such rule so provides.. . .' Thus the Board is made
the final arbiter as to which acts shall be criminal and which shall not. The
ultimate determination as to whether a violation shall constitute an
offense is not made by the Legislature in the statute itself, but is delegated
to the discretion of the board. . . .The legislative discretion to declare a
crime has thus been attempted to be delegated to the Board. This is not
only the delegation of the substantive power to determine a crime. We
hold this attempted delegation to be a violation of the legislative article of
5 People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y.S. 74 (1934), affdper curiam, 267 N.Y. 508,
1% N E 553 (1935).
6 Id. at3I-312,275N.Y.S. at77.
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the Constitution. The legislative power to create an offense may not be so
delegated.7
This places somewhat too great an emphasis upon the legislature's
choice of means to reach a desired goal. Suppose for a moment that the
New York legislature had declared every violation of a Board rule to be
a misdemeanor, except that the Board could state in any particular rule
or rules that a penal sanction would not attach to violations. If that had
been done, the legislature would have created the punishable crime, with
" only a power of dispensation (the power to declare something not to be a
crime) left in administrative hands.' The result would have been the same
as was sought in the New York situation described above, but without
delegating the "legislative discretion to declare a crime." Perhaps the
courts would have found fault also with an attempted delegation of
power to declare a non-crime, but assuredly the opinion would have had
to have been drastically rewritten had the draftsman couched the statute
in a different form having precisely the same effect.'
2. Administrative Prescription of the Penalty Attaching to An Offense
Suppose that a legislature is ready to declare violations of regulations
to be an offense, but hesitates to put a fixed price tag on an offense whose
precise nature cannot be foretold. May it, then, regard this as one of the
legislative "details" it may delegate to its subordinate, the
administrative agency which has responsibility for effectuating the
legislature's policy?
A still-cited case of the last century indignantly rejected that
possibility. The California Legislature had authorized harbor
commissioners to make rules for whose violation penalties not to exceed
$500 could be imposd; in order to fit the penalty to the offense, the rule-
makers were empowered to set the amount of the penalty (within the
7. Id. at 312, 313-314, 275 N.Y.S. at 77-79.
8. Examples of the "dispensing power" abound. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain &
Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932); State v. Davis, 178 Ark. 153, 10 S.W.2d 513 (1928); State ev rel.
Boynton v. Board of Education, 137 Kans. 451, 21 P.2d 295 (1933).
9. The importance of good draftsmanship in this field can scarcely be overstated. See, e.g., State
v. Curtis, 230 N.C. 169, 52 S.E.2d 364 (1949), where the legislature indicated willingness to call
every violation of a local health regulation a crime, but conferred on the health board a perhaps too
embracively stated power to fix by rules the penalties which "in its judgment shall be necesary to
protect and advance the public health." This, the court said, ran "counter to the principle that the
legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law." In all probability the legislature meant merely
to leave room for reducing penalties rather than for enlarging them, but it did express itself ineptly.
A subsequent and far more rigid statute, which declared every violation to be a misdemeanor
punishable by fine or up to thirty days in jail, caused no judicial concern.
[Vol. 1970:265
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permitted maximum) that would attach to various kinds of infractions.
This, the California court declared, was absolutely unconstitutional;
"the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter
purely in the hands of the legislature."' 10
A more recent Massachusetts case, however, was more tolerant of
legislative efforts to make the punishment fit the crime. Commonwealth
v. Diaz" upheld a statute authorizing the commissioner of airport
management to adopt "reasonable and expedient" rules for use of state-
owned airports and to provide in his rules penalties for their violation
"not exceeding five hundred dollars for any one offense." The
commissioner subsequently adopted comprehensive rules and
regulations. One of them required taxicab drivers who were lined up
awaiting passengers to remain within six feet of their vehicles. Another
rule stated broadly: "Any person who violates the provisions of these
rules and regulations, shall be subject to the penalty not exceeding five
hundred ($500.00) dollars for any offense." Diaz was convicted in the
lower court on a complaint that he had violated the rule against straying
from his cab; he was sentenced to pay a fine of $25; and he appealed on
the grounds that both the statute and the commissioner's rules were
invalid.
Addressing itself first to the issue of legislative delegation, the court
said:
The fact that the statute empowered the commissioner . . . to provide
penalties for the violation of the regulations did not render it invalid. This
is not a case where the statute authorized the commissioner to fix such
penalties as he saw fit. Had the statute attempted to do that it would have
been an excessive delegation of power.. . . But the statute here did not do
that; it empowered the commissioner . . . to 'provide penalties for the
violation of said rules and regulations not exceeding five hundred dollars
for any one offence.' While the commissioner could prescribe penalties he
could do so only within limits definitely prescribed by the Legislature. 12
The court cited other instances in which a local governing body or
board had been empowered to prescribe penalties within statutorily fixed
limits. In those instances, the court added,
[T]he power to prescribe penalties was within narrower limits than those
10. Board of Harbor Commissioners v. Excelsior Redwood Co., 88 Cal. 491,26 P. 375, (1891).
4ccord, Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal.2d 384,60 P.2d 847 (1936); Davis v. State, 126 Ark.
260, 190 S.W. 436 (1916) (dictum).
II . 326 Mass. 525,95 N.E.2d 666 (1950).
12. Id. at 529, 95 N.E.2d at 669.
Vol. 1970:2651
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granted here. It is one thing to give to a board or municipality power to fix
penalties not in excess of $20 or even $100 and quite another to empower it
to fix them up to $500. The authority which may be granted to a local
governing body to fix penalties, even when a maximum limit is prescribed,
is not unrestricted. Such bodies cannot be granted a roving commission to
establish within broad limits such penalties as they see fit. That is
essentially a legislative power which cannot be delegated. The question is
one of degree. The 'use, operation, and maintenance of state-owned
airports' 'could conceivably necessitate rules and regulations relating to
much more hazardous activities than those arising from the operation of
taxicabs and limousines. The power to determine penalties granted to the
commissioner here goes to the very verge of what is permissible, but we
are not prepared to say that it crosses the line. 13
The court offered no tools to assist in determining the whereabouts of
"the very verge of what is permissible" or in drawing "the line" that
must not be crossed. The opinion leaned heavily on the historical fact
that power to prescribe penalties had in the past been delegated to
municipalities; but the court gave no apparent thought to whether the
justifications for municipal delegations were different from those that
would support a legislative delegation of power to an airport
commissioner.14 The decision would have been more illuminating for the
future had the court considered, as it presumably would have done with
other types of delegations of legislative power, first, whether practical
need for delegation could be discerned and, second, whether the
legislature had provided guidance for its agent, the airport
commissioner.
The outcome of the case would no doubt have been unaltered had the
somewhat more functional approach been taken. The need for flexibility
in penalty levels is apparent. Certainly the taxicab driver who strays
13. The court held for the defendant, however, as to the validity of the commissioner's rules. It
said, in effect, that the cominissioner had acted arbitrarily in declaring that every violation of every
rule would subject the violators to a possible fine of $500. The legislature had obviously meant to
vary the penalty in accord with the relative seriousness of the offense involved. I f it had wanted every
violation to be punishable by a fine up to $500, it could have said so itself, without delegating to the
commissioner any power to be more moderate.
14. Grants of power to municipalities, whether in the form of municipal charters, general laws, or
enactments of special applicability, tend to be very broadly phrased; yet delegations of this
character "commonly go unchallenged in the courts, and when any comment is made it is referred
to as an exception to the general rule prohiiting the delegation of such power." Foster, The
Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Officers, 7 ILL. L. REv. 397, 398 (1913).
Compare Smallwood v. District of Columbia, 17 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1927). For a discussion of the
municipal corporation doctrine, see Note, The Violation of a Municipal Ordinance as a Crime, I
VAND. L. REv. 262 (1948); Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1343 (1948).
[Vol. 1970:265
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from his vehicle is less a menace to airport operations than is an airplane
pilot who ignores landing instructions or blocks a runway. If different
penalties are to attach to violations of rules, either the administrator
must prescribe variable penalties or a court must be empowered to
exercise its discretion when penalizing violators brought before it. Does
the Constitution compel the legislature to choose thejudicial rather than
the administrative means of achieving flexibility in the scale of
applicable penalties?
As for legislative guidance in the form of "standards" which will
shape a delegate's actions, one might perhaps contend that the
Massachusetts statute was deficient. It authorized the delegate to
"provide penalties .. .not exceeding five hundred dollars for any one
offence," without setting forth the factors that were to lead to lesser
penalties for some infractions than for others. But in all probability a
modern court would quickly dispose of the point. Although no legislative
direction had in this instance been formally stated, the standard was
implicit in the subject matter, namely, that the severity of the penalty
was to be affected by the seriousness of the conduct prohibited. 15
3. Administrative Imposition of Penalties in Individual Cases
We turn now from rulemaking that defines the acts to be penalized or
that prescribes the possible penalties. This section of the discussion
pertains instead to the administrative application of rules or statutes in
individual instances of alleged wrongdoing.
The sanctions that administrators may utilize in order to effectuate
general policies are indeed broad-almost as broad as the subject
matters involved." The legislature may empower administrators, for
example, to seize physical objects (such as foods or drugs believed to be
tainted), issue cease and desist orders that resemble injunctive decrees,
deport aliens, restrict use of the mails, dismiss public servants, and
suspend or revoke occupational or commercial licenses. Obviously the
consequences may be drastic. Even a brief suspension of a license, for
instance, may possibly cost a licensee thousands of dollars. May the
legislature instead validly give the administrator the power to utilize an
economic sanction of lesser severity? Specifically, may it authorize the
administrator to impose a money penalty when he deems this an
appropriate means of law enforcement?
15 As to the adequacy of implicit standards, see Paterson v. University of the State of New
York, 14 N.Y.2d 432,252 N.Y.S. 2d 452 (1964).
16 See generally McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L. REV.
4411964).
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The New York Legislature apparently thought that this was a feasible
and desirable method of forcing licensed insurance companies to toe the
mark. Revoking their licenses to do business was a sanction so
disastrous in its consequences that it could not be used except at the risk
of injury to the public at large. Yet some means was needed to make
insurance companies mindful of the state's rules concerning filing
information about their business operations. In 1952 the legislature
authorized the Superintendent of Insurance, after notice and hearing, to
impose a penalty of not to exceed $1000 for willful violation of
provisions of the Insurance Law relating to filings. The statute makes
the Superintendent's order imposing the penalty reviewable by the
courts. Unless the penalty order is stayed by a court, failure to pay the
penalty within thirty days is a misdemeanor. Imposition of a penalty of
$13,000 has been upheld by the courts without perturbation.17
Giving federal officials the power to enforce penalties without
invoking the aid of courts has similarly been upheld. As long ago as
1909, the Supreme Court sustained the administrative imposition of
fines upon ship owners whose vessels had brought diseased aliens to this
country. 8 Some years later, when the amount of the money penalty had
been increased ten-fold, the Court adhered to its view that "due process
of law does not require that the courts, rather than administrative
17. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Thacher, 12 N.Y.2d 48, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962). The
statutory provision in question is N.Y. INs. LAW § 225 (1966). Professor Bernard Schwartz says
of the statute just cited:
It is difficult to imagine a statutory provision more repugnant to the basic principles upon
which our administrative law is grounded. It violates the fundamental rule that the
imposition of a money penalty is, with us, a judicial, not an administrative function. The
dangers inherent in allowing administrative authority to extend to the imposition of
monetary penalties seem clear, and because of them, statutes like the New York law under
discussion are comparatively rare, the usual thing being for the legislature itself to prescribe
that the infraction of administrative rules or orders shall be subject to a stated penalty as a
breach of the act. This principle is said to date back to Stuart times and the objection to
penalties imposed by royal proclamation.
Schwartz, 1952 Survey of New York Law-Administrative Law, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 928-29 (1952).
18. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). The statute required ship
owners who bring to the United States aliens afflicted "with a loathsome or with a dangerous
contagious disease" to pay to the collector of customs $100 in each such case "if it shall appear to
the satisfaction of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor" that the existence of the disease might
have been detected by a medical examination at the time of embarkation. The statute also provided
that "no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains
unpaid . . ." A shipowner, contesting interference with its operations, argued that a penalty could
not be "authorized and its collection committed to an administrative officer without the necessity of
resorting to the judicial power." Chief Justice White, speaking for the entire Court, rejected the
argument.
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officers, be charged, in any case, with determining the facts upon which
the imposition of such a fine depends."19
The decisions just discussed had rested in part on the authority of
cases arising under the internal revenue laws, which have long authorized
administrative officials to impose civil penalties in the form of additions
to a taxpayer's bill for taxes due the United States. The validity of the
revenue penalty system came squarely and dramatically before the
Supreme Court when an administrative penalty in the tidy amount of
$364,354.92 was sought to be imposed on Charles Mitchell, a prominent
banker. 20 He had previously been acquitted of charges that he had
wilfully attempted to defraud the revenue. Section 293 (b) of the Revenue
Act of 1928 provided, "If any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with
intent to evade tax, then 50 per centum of the total amount of the
deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be so assessed, collected
and paid. . . ." Mitchell, having been unsuccessfully prosecuted for tax
evasion, contended that this proceeding to collect the 50 per cent fraud
assessment was barred under the doctrine of double jeopardy because the
50 per centum addition was not a tax, but a criminal penalty as
punishment for allegedly fraudulent acts. "The question for decision,"
said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "is thus whether § 293(b) imposes a
criminal sanction." The opinion then developed the reasons why the
sanction is "remedial" or "civil" rather than "criminal."
In assessing income taxes the Government relies primarily upon the
disclosure by the taxpayer of the relevant facts. This disclosure it requires
him to make in his annual return. To ensure full and honest disclosure, to
discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax, Congress imposes
sanctions. . . .Remedial sanctions may be of varying types. One which is
characteristically free of the punitive criminal element is revocation of a
privilege voluntarily granted. Forfeiture of goods or their value and the
payment of fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which
have been recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since the original
revenue law of 1789. . . . The remedial character of sanctions imposing
additions to a tax has been made clear by this court in passing upon
similar legislation. They are provided primarily as a safeguard for the
protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy
expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's
fraud . .2' That Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for the
19. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932).
20. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
2 1. The explanation that penalties are reimbursement for investigative expenses and losses caused
by the taxpayer's fraud, seems far-fetched, since the amount of the penalty is in no way related to
Vol. 1970:2651
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collection of the additional 50 per centum indicates clearly that it intended
a civil, not a criminal sanction . . .22 [T]he determination of the facts
upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead
of ajury. . .
Economic regulation as well as tax collection has engendered
litigation about administrative fines. Under the authority of the Wage
Stabilization Act of 1942 and Executive Order 9250, the Economic
Stabilization Director promulgated regulations empowering the
National War Labor Board to conduct hearings to determine whether
wages had been paid without adherence to applicable laws and rules. If
the Board found a violation of the stabilization regulations, it could then
direct the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to disregard for the
purpose of calculating deductions under the revenue laws the entire
amount of such wages or an amount reduced "in the light of such
extenuating circumstances as are found to be present in each case and all
other pertinent considerations." A panel of the Board found that the
Woodworth Company had made payments in violation of the Act and
recommended that certain sums be disregarded for the purpose of
calculating Woodworth's business expenses that could be set off against
income for 1944 and 1945. The Board found certain "extenuating
circumstances" and determined that the sum of $50,000 for each of the
two years should be disregarded. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed a deficiency, which the taxpayer paid. Suit was then brought by
Woodworth to recover $80,614, the amount of the deficiency plus
interest. The suit failed; Congress was held to have power to provide
"civil sanctions as an aid to effecting its purposes in fields in which it has
constitutional power to act . . . and . it can delegate that power to
administrative agencies."
The quantitative significance of this decision can readily be suggested.
During 1944 and 1945, the years here involved, the National War Labor
Board's regional office for New York and Northern New Jersey closed
the amount of the Government's costs. More realistically, heavy penalties are imposed so that the
fear of loss will deter would-be defrauders of the public.
22. The "distinctly civil procedure" here provided was collection by distraint. Compare Rex
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956), where a monetary exaction from a person who
had defrauded the United States was called a "civil" rather than a "criminal" remedy because the
underlying statute had spoken of "liquidated damages" instead of "fine" as a penalty for
wrongdoing.
23. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-402 (1938).
24. N.A. Woodworth Co. v. Kavanaugh, 102 F. Supp. 9, 11 (E.D. Mich. 1952), affd 202 F.2d
154 (6th Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 1970:265
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781 enforcement cases involving potential disallowances. The
disallowances amounted to $2,012,729.58. This may be compared with
the figure of $1,249,835.30, which represents the total of fines assessed in
all types of criminal cases during 1945 by the very active United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Yet cases can be found which tend to reverse the usually accepted
proposition that the greater includes the lesser. Probably every court
would readily agree that a public official can validly be empowered to
administer an economic death sentence to a privately operated business
by license revocation or by refusal to enter into contracts or by shutting
off some other advantage.2 But some courts apparently believe that an
administrative imposition of a minor monetary penalty, having far less
disastrous consequences for the private business, would subvert the
Constitution. Thus, for example, the Illinois court held unconstitutional
as an invalid delegation of judicial power a statute which required public
works contractors to pay not less than the prevailing wage, imposed a
penalty of $ 10 per day for each laborer receiving substandard wages, and
authorized the penalties to be deducted from the contract price by the
political body awarding the contract. 2
Judicial hostility toward administrative entry into competition with
the courts is also exemplified by a Utah decision which, though now
somewhat antique, has not yet been eroded by newer currents of thought
in that state. A statute had authorized the state tax commission to
impose a penalty of not less then $10 nor more than $299 for failure to
25 L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944); Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v.
Alexander, 109 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 646 (1940).
26 Reid v. Smith, 375 II. 147, 30 N.E.2d 908 (1940). In a later case, Vissering Mercantile Co. v.
Annunzio, 1 111. 2d 108, 115 N.E.2d 306 (1953), the court declined to extend the Reid case beyond
it% facts. The statute involved in Vissering authorized the Labor Department, after notice and
hearing and a finding of noncompliance with a minimum wage order, to publish the name of the
noncomplying employer. The employer, contending that the statute conferred judicial power on the
department in violation of the Illinois constitution, relied on Reid v. Smith. The court upheld the
statute, reasoning that the "financial loss which might ensue from the publicity is inflicted, not by
the administrative agency, as in the Reid case, but by the public ... " The dissenting justice
argued that it was "entirely unrealistic to treat the publication . . . as anything other than a
penalty.. . The determination and order is no less a judicial act of the Department of Labor
simply because the sanctions are employed by the general public."
For an impressive general discussion of the variable impact and possible abusiveness of officially
inspired publicity, see Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 225
(1957). And see also McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L. REV.
441. 457-58 (1964). Dean McKay remarks that in health matters, the general public "may be
enlisted as effective enforcement allies who are not too concerned about the niceties of the particular
charges, but may be readily stimulated to a reluctance to buy amounting to a boycott."
Vol. 1970:265]
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affix revenue stamps on cigarette packages. The penalty was to be
collected by the sheriff in a manner similar to a writ of execution. After
taking evidence, the commission imposed a penalty of $250 on the
plaintiffs, who sought to prevent collection by the sheriff. The court held
the statute unconstitutional:
Giving to the tax commission the power to determine in its own judgment
the amount of the penalty was a legislative function which could not be
delegated. It is not the power to enforce or apply a law, but the power to
make a law for each partiqular case, to determine in its judgment the
amount of a penalty. . . . he infirmity . . of the [statute] lies in the
fact that the tax commission can in each case name a different sum. It has
not set a standard for all cases which fit the rule, but in each case within its
mind at its discretion fixes the amount. Only the courts in imposing a fine
as a punishment for a crime have this discretion.2;
Fairly read, the Utah statute conveyed no power to impose monetary
penalties in an unbridled, whimsical manner. Clearly, the legislature
meant that the punishment should be affected by the nature of the
offense and the offender; and failure to exercise discretion fairly-either
by ignoring relevant factors or by considering irrelevancies-would
presumably be subject to judicial correction.
To be sure, no general phraseology can absolutely assure socially
sound or, even, internally harmonious exercises of discretion. One of the
most notorious defects in the entire American legal system is the
disparity in sentences meted out by judges to offenders of the same
type.2s Possibilities of abusiveness, favoritism, venality, discrimination,
absent-mindedness, and sheer silliness do exist when a penalizer has a
choice about the severity of the penalty he will utilize. Who can deny
this? Must one then conclude that the danger of abuse and the difficulty
of correcting it when it does occur are so great that the legislature must
not confer upon administrators the power to impose variable money
penalties, whether they be called fines or something else? Or are these
merely factors to be carefully weighed by the legislature before choosing
to confer any power of that kind?-to be weighed, one might add, along
with such other factors as the danger that inheres in automaticity (as in
some of the savage mandatory penalties for narcotics offenses) and the
danger that a drastic sanction may not be effective because its side
effects on others are too undesirable.
27. Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404,416-18,57 P.2d 734,740-41 (1936).
28. The matter is powerfully discussed in K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 133-41 (1969).
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This is not a plea for transferring fine-imposition from judges to
administrators. It is, rather, simply a plea for realism in determining
how best to apply the pressures which may be needed to make social
controls effective. That determination should not be shaped by
preconceptions about whose job it is to do what.
A study of the enforcement of housing codes, conducted recently by an
able public administrator and a broadly experienced law professor, may
serve as a suggestive model." Its authors point out that, traditionally
throughout the United States, laws concerning the proper construction
or maintenance of multi-family housing properties have been chiefly
enforced either by orders to vacate the premises as unfit for human
occupancy or by criminal prosecution, usually looking toward
imposition of a fine. In most cities today, however, the supply of low rent
housing is too limited to permit use of the "vacate order", which would
otherwise be a powerful weapon in the hands of the enforcement agency.
What, then, about prosecution?
In New York City there are some 20,000 prosecutions for housing
violations every year, most of them heard in a special part of the criminal
courts. Each of the prosecutions involves several separate counts of
violation, and may involve as many as a hundred separate violations. And
yet, in 1965, the average fine per case (not per violation) was under
fourteen dollars. Calculated per violation, the average fine was said to be
about fifty cents. Many violations so penalized have been outstanding for
months, if not years, and many of them are of a hazardous nature. These
inconsequential penalties are not the result of inadequate provisions of the
law; on the contrary, the New York statutes allow the imposition of very
heavy fines, ranging up to $1,000 per violation for repeated offenders, and
provide for jail sentences of up to six months. Yet fines have remained
minimal and landlords find it cheaper to pay the fine than to make the
repair. Jail sentences for slum lords are practically never imposed, and
hence remain an empty threat.30
Part of the reason criminal sanctions do not work in housing code
enforcement is that housing violations do not impress the courts as true
crimes-the kind that involve committing a real wrong with a guilty
mind instead of merely non-compliance with a positive legal
requirement.3 1 Criminal courts are simply not attuned to deal with
29. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1254 (1966).
30. Id. at 1276-77.
31. For a somewhat different categorizing of usual crime on the one hand and "administrative
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"social welfare offenses".32 Criffhinal prosecution should no doubt be
retained for a few exceptional cases, but because "housing violations are
basically economic offenses, the way to deal with them is through the
imposition of economic sanctions." The remedy used "must aim at
inducing-both directly and indirectly-the future repair and
rehabilitation of structures by their owners. The emphasis must be on
solving the difficulties created by the problem building-not on the
useless enterprise of punishing the troublesome owner."
Mr. Gribetz and Professor Grad therefore propose that a new civil
penalty be created, "fixed by law at so much per violation per day,"
recoverable by civil action and collectible, if need be, out of the
building's rents. If, for example, a housing inspection were to uncover
four code violations, the owner would be notified about the violations
and would be told that if they had not been removed by a stated date
(perhaps two or three weeks hence), a civil penalty fixed by a law at three
dollars per violation would be imposed for each day the asserted
improprieties remained uncorrected. If reinspection were to show that
the building's defects had been overcome, the matter would be closed,
the owner being notified to that effect. But if the owner had delayed
making the needed repairs, the administrative enforcement agency could
sue to recover the suitable civil penalty-$3.00 multiplied by the number
of violations multiplied by the number of days of inaction after the
deadline. The authors add:
The department could proceed to legal action at any time after the period
for compliance has elapsed; under those circumstances, the action would
not be for a fixed amount but for such amount of statutory penalties as
might be shown to be due. . .The defendant could limit the amount of
the penalty by making repairs during the pendency of the action, notifying
the Department that he had done so...3
Some such plan of cumulative, mandatory, civil penalties seems far
more likely to be administrable than the present haphazard system of
criminal prosecutions. The suggested daily penalty of $3.00 per
violation, as Messrs. Gribetz and Grad remark,
• ..is less than the usual parking ticket, and the penalty would not begin
crime" on the other, stressing the "retributive" nature of proceedings involving the former and the
"deterrent" emphasis of proceedings involving the latter, see Schwenk, The Administrative Crime,
Its Creation and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REv. 51 (1943); Note,
Administrative Penalty Regulations, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1943).
32. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1254, 1279 (1966).
33. Id. at 1283.
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to run until the offender has had an adequate time for compliance.
Moreover, the offender has it within his power to reduce the amount of the
penalty by making repairs promptly. Furthermore, the amount of the
penalty is determinable in advance. The remedy is an economic penalty,
and the offender has the opportunity to calculate how much his
noncompliance will cost him; no calendar jockeying to get before an easy
judge, or temporary, time-wasting pleas of 'not guilt' can affect the
amount of the penalty. The fixed fine, too, removes the gambling element
from housing cases; there is no chance that an owner with long-continued,
serious violations will get away with an insignificant fine, nor is there a
risk that the owner with few or minor violations who intended to repair
promptly will unexpectedly suffer severe penalties. Finally, the remedy is
less likely to encounter judicial nullification, because, unlike criminal
prosecution, it does not subject the decent owner who is caught with
violations on his property to the risk of a lifetime criminal record.3
The authors whose conclusions have been summarized propose, in the
end, the creation of a "civil housing court" in which penalty proceedings
would be initiated by the suitable housing agency. One may well
question, however, whether either the Constitution or an unchangeable
public policy would compel the creation of a new court (or the further
burdening of already heavily overburdened civil courts), instead of the
creation of a fair hearing procedure within the administrative agency
itself to pass upon cases in which the owner denies the existence of the
building defects an inspector has assertedly discovered.
In any event, the housing code enforcement problem here sketched is
illustrative of the need to take an organic approach to penalty definition
and imposition. Penalties are not ends in themselves, but are means to
the end of achieving observance of declared social regulations. They
should be analyzed contextually, not conceptually.
4. Remission, Mitigation, and Compromise of Penalties
Suppose that a statute, instead of allowing an administrator to impose
a penalty, were to allow him to abate a penalty that might otherwise be
indisputably collectible. Suppose, for example, that a state cigarette tax
law were to provide that for non-affixation of required revenue stamps
"there is imposed a civil penalty of $1,000 to be recovered by
proceedings in a proper court. Upon application therefore the tax
commission may remit or mitigate such penalty." The Tax Commission
concludes that a cigarette vendor has failed to affix the required stamps.
34. Id. at 1285.
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The Commission notifies the vendor that it is referring the case to the
district attorney for recovery of the $1000 penalty, and encloses a form
of application for remission of the penalty, which the vendor may return
to the Commission if he does not contest his liability to pay $1,000. As is
well known in the trade, the Commission's policy is to mitigate the
$1000 penalty to about $200.
Or suppose that the statute had provided that vendors of tobacco must
be licensed and had authorized the commission "to revoke, or suspend
for a period up to one year, the license of any vendor who fails to
purchase and affix tax stamps as provided herein. In those cases where
the commission shall suspend a license, the commission may accept from
the licensee an offer in compromise as a penalty in lieu of such
suspension and shall thereupon rescind its order of suspension. The offer
in compromise shall be at the rate of one dollar ($1.00) for each day of
suspension." After notice and hearing, the commission suspends
vendor's license for 200 days.
In both of these instances the vendor will be under nearly irresistible
pressures to apply for mitigation or compromise. If he fails to seek
mitigation in the first case, he runs the risk of paying not $200 but $1000
plus court expenses and attorney's fees. In the second, if his tobacco
business is at all significant, he can better afford to pay $1 a day than to
have the license suspended. Of course, by applying for mitigation or
compromise, the vendor will lose his chance to litigate the merits of the
commission's charges. The mitigation or compromise device "thus
becomes a kind of administrative blackmail." 35 Moreover, the
possibility of discriminatory exercises of the discretionary power to be
lenient cannot be overlooked when the standards that guide judgment
are unformulated; judicial review will not be readily available to one who
has, in essence, "thrown himself upon the mercy of the court." 3
'35. Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties, 4 WEST. POL.Q. 610, 620
(1951).
36. Compare MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF MARINE INSPECTION AND NAVIGATION, Sen.
Doc. No. 186, Part 10, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 26-27 (1940):
The power is one which because of its very nature is likely to be exercised with some degree
of arbitrariness .... One who is content to submit a written application for mitigation or
remission is likely to pay a much larger fine than the individual or corporation which sends a
representative to Washington to address argument to the officials. It is undeniable that
pressures substantially affect the ultimate conclusion. . . . Partly because pressure from
organized labor was sufficiently strong, not a single fine imposed upon owners in connection
with a recent tanker strike was mitigated.
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Yet mitigation and compromise provisions are common in both
federal and state statutes, 37 and
. . [t]he arguments in favor of the device. . . are sound. A multitude of
small cases are settled without resort to the courts. Certainly in many of
these cases formal adjudication would be an altogether meaningless and
needless step. The device offers a lever to secure compliance with the law
which the more ponderous instrument of court action could not afford. It
has also been suggested that the administrator can more exactly measure
the degree of culpability of an offender than can a court, and can prevent
hardship to the unintentional offender. And, finally, there is the usual
argument in favor of administrative action: the expertness of
administrators in dealing with a specialized subject.3
The problem is to devise a procedure that will retain these advantages
and at the same time eliminate or reduce the potentiality of abuse. The
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
recommended a hearing before hearing commissioners to determine de
novo whether offenses have been committed and to fix the amount of the
penalties. The Committee also suggested that "in order to resolve any
doubts about the constitutionality of the procedure, . . . the aggrieved
person be permitted review de novo by a Federal district court. .... ,,3
The Task Force on Legal Service and Procedure of the Second Hoover
Commission urged that
Judicial functions, such as the imposition of money penalties, the
remission or compromise of money penalties, the award of reparations or
damages, and the issuance of injunctive orders, should be transferred to
the courts wherever possible. . . . Where a money penalty is imposed by
a court, no agency should have authority to mitigate or remit .... Power
37. J. CHAMBERLAIN, N. DOWLING. & P. HAYS, THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 100-02 (1942), and Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission
of Penalties, 4 WEST. POL. Q. 610 (1951), give examples. See also R. CHILDS, MAKING REPEAL
WORK 168-69 (1947), for a listing of compromise provisions in state liquor control statutes.
38. Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties, 4 WEST POL. Q. 610, 619
(1951).
39. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, SEN.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1941). The Committee did not spell out the exact nature of
the "'doubts about constitutionality" which led it to leave open the possibility of de novo judicial
proceedings. Perhaps the answer lies in the Committee's monograph concerning the Bureau of
Marine Inspection and Navigation, cited in note 36 supra, at 29n: "Such doubts might arise from
the circumstance that money penalties have traditionally been imposed by courts, so that such
imposition might be regarded as a 'judicial function' which could not validly be transferred to an
administrative agency." This is an example of what Justice Holmes had in mind when he remarked
that sometimes a page of history is worth more than a volume of logic.
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of remission of judicially imposed fines should be exercised only by the
court which possesses the penalty power in the first instance. Where both
the power to impose and to remit monetary penalties are left with an
agency, special procedural safeguards should be provided. Agency hearing
should be held in connection with remissions and mitigation.*
Congress has not, however, followed the advice thus given-probably
for the purely pragmatic reason that a prudent division of law
administration labor precludes having everything done personally by a
few hundred lifetime judges instead of by many lesser (possibly even less
wise or less sensitive or less scrupulous) officials. The Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 is an example.41 It provides penalties at the rate of $ 1000 for
numerous types of violation, including violation of administrative
regulations. As a matter of practice the aviation agency, when it believes
a violation has occurred, sends to the alleged violator a "civil penalty
letter" with a "suggested compromise figure" that may range from $25
to $900. Few of these "suggestions" are rejected.42
Somewhat similarly, the Federal Communications Commission has
been empowered to remit or mitigate penalties (denominated
"forfeitures") ranging as high as $1000 per day or an aggregate of
$ 10,000 for certain types of misconduct by licensees. The Commission in
the first instance gives the licensee a notice of "apparent liability." The
licensee may then set forth its position, in writing. Although a contested
"forfeiture" can be collected only by a civil suit if the licensee chooses to
fight to the last ditch, the Commission may settle the matter before
litigation for whatever fraction seems to it to be suitable, all things
considered-and it may exercise its discretionary judgment with or
without procedural formalities, as it may prefer.4 3 Technically, the
Commission does not determine the licensee's liability or the amount of
the forfeiture; the former is triable in court, and the latter is fixed by
statute. But in reality, as is plain enough, the Commission can pretty
well call the tune.
This is not to say that the Commission's power is oppressively
exercised. During the calendar year 1969, for instance, 932 Notices of
Apparent Liability were issued; the Commission mitigated the amount
40. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. TASK
FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 242,244 (1955).
41.49US.C. § 1301 (1963).
42. See Murphy, Money Penalties-An Administrative Sword of Damocles, 2 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 113,114-115 (1962).
43. 47 U S.C. § 504 (1962).
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of forfeiture originally proposed in 426 of these 932 cases and remitted
forfeiture altogether in 220 of the remainder. These figures show
considerable readiness to be attentive to licensees' comments and to
weigh additional information that might justify mitigating or remitting
liability. In all the years that the Commission has possessed authority to
proceed in court to collect penalties assessed against alleged violators,
however, it has had to resort to court enforcement only five times. In two
of those five cases which had not been finally disposed of by purely
administrative processes, the defendants finally prevailed; the other three
defendants paid up when litigation was initiated . 4
5. Detention of the Person
The expansion of administrative powers to impose "civil" or
"remedial" fines raises the further question whether authority to
imprison may be delegated to administrative officials.
The power to detain the person as an incident of administering health
laws is of course widely exercised. Quarantining sick persons to prevent
spreading the infection among the well has long been regarded as
permissible.45 The courts have upheld, for example, the validity of laws
involving institutional detention of venereal disease carriers, without
resort to judicial proceedings. 4
But detention of this sort is so clearly preventive rather than punitive
in purpose and in a sense so impersonal that it may have little bearing on
power to penalize by imprisoning the person. True penalization was
invalidated in Wong Wing v. United States,47 "one of the bulwarks of
the Constitution.1 4 An act of Congress provided that a Chinese person
who had been found by a court commissioner to be in the country
unlawfully "shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period not exceeding
one year, and thereafter removed from the United States." Pursuant to
44 Letter to the author from Henry Geller, F.C.C. General Counsel, Feb. 5, 1970, on file at
Washington University Law Quarterly.
45. See Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
46. See Ex Parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843,42 S.W.2d 21 (1931), which upheld an ordinance providing
for a compulsory physical examination of every person "arrested for being a prostitute... ;" if
the examination revealed that the person was suffering from venereal disease in an infectious stage,
-such person shall be quarantined and detained in a hospital. . . until such time as such person is
no longer capable of conveying the disease to others." Accord, Brown v. Manning, 103 Neb. 540,
172 N W. 522 (1919); contra, Wragg v. Griffin, 185 Iowa 243,170 N.W. 400 (1919), 28 YALE L.J.
703 (1919),
47. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
48. Hart. The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1387 (1953).
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this statute, Wong Wing was arrested and brought before a
commissioner of the federal circuit court in Michigan, who found that
Wong Wing was unlawfully within the country and adjudged that he
should be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of 60 days. Wong Wing
sought a writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court thought it perfectly "clear that detention, or
temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to
the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid";
for Congress may forbid the entry or order the expulsion of aliens and
"can, in order to make effectual such decree of exclusion or expulsion,
devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting the persons
included in such decree, and causing their deportation, upon executive or
subordinate officials. 49
Nevertheless, "when Congress sees fit to further promote such a
policy by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment
at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, we think such
legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the
guilt of the accused . .." The statute, by providing for
imprisonment, in effect declared unlawful residence to be an "infamous
crime"'-and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments declare that no person
shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless
on presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.
Is this not the answer to the problem? Imprisonment as a deterrent of
anti-social behavior is traditionally the earmark of the criminal law. The
processes of the criminal law, fortified by explicit federal and state
constitutional provisions, are calculated to furnish safeguards against
arbitrary deprivations of liberty of the person. So long as imprisonment
is the sanctions, should the law not insist that, however the statute may
denominate the proceeding, it is in fact and in custom a criminal
proceeding, to be disposed of in accordance with the practice developed
in that branch ofjurisprudence?50
49. This dictum has been strengthened by Abel v. United States, 362 US. 217 (1960), involving
arrest by immigration authorities of an alien who was illegally in the United States-but whose real
illegality was his being a Soviet spy.
50. Some historical exceptions must of course be noted, such as the vestigial remnants of
imprisonment for debt as well as civil contempts of courts or legislatures. And see also Note,
Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, STAN. L. REv. 109 (1950). For a discussion of many
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Conclusion
(1) The arguments against administrative imposition of money
penalties are not very strong;
(2) Courts have occasionally been hostile to statutes giving
administrative officers large discretion in the severity of the penalty to be
imposed, because they fear that inequality in application of the sanction
will result; therefore, to the extent practicable, the statutes should
contain guides to the considerations that should weigh with the delegate;
(3) Notice and hearing should typically precede administrative
penalizing, lest the existence of the power be denied because of the
impropriety of the procedure employed;
(4) The use of administrative sanctions is justifiable mainly in
respect of matters already or typically committed to administrative
supervision and control (e.g., workmen's compensation, taxation, public
utility regulation). Even if possibly valid, the power to impose penalties
for anti-social behavior not directly related to an extensive regulatory
scheme (e.g., disorderly conduct, sedition, counterfeiting) should not be
committed to administrative hands. In short, the administrative power
to penalize should be an incident of other functions, rather than an
activity standing alone;
(5) In the present state of the law, confusion will probably be
avoided if conduct which is to be subject to administrative penalties is
not also denounced as criminal and subject to the sanctions of the
criminal law, but no really persuasive reason argues against legislative
prescription of a whole arsenal of sanctions, to be used cumulatively or
alternatively as the case may be; many decided cases, such as those
involving income tax fraud, show that an act otherwise criminal may
also be subjected to an administrative penalty;
(6) The policy arguments against permitting administrative officers
to incarcerate individuals by a procedure free from the protective
restraints of criminal trials, are overpoweringly strong.51 Since doctrinal
support for the policy arguments is readily available, the courts are
aspects of detention of the person because of mental illness, see Ross, Commitment of the Mentally
III: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945 (1959); Kadish, A Case Study in the
Signfication of Procedural Due Process-Institutionalizing the Mental III, 9 WEST. POL. Q. 93
(1956). For a highly readable account of a related problem, see Fahr, Iowa's New Sexual
Psychopath Law-An Experiment Noble in Purpose?, 41 IOWA L. REV. 523 (1956).
51 For effective discussion of the potentiality of danger in the power to make "administrative
arrests", see I B. SCHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 54-62 (1968); and compare McKay,
Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L. REV. 441,464-67 (1964).
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unlikely to uphold an attempted authorization of administrative prison
sentences; but, even here, the Supreme Court has expressed tolerance of
temporary incarceration without judicial order, where necessarily
incident to the effective execution of administrative duties;52
(7) One implication of the conclusion that administrative agencies
may not imprison is that collection of administratively imposed money
penalties must be by civil action or by direct administrative action, as by
distraint. In criminal proceedings, refusal to pay a fine imposed by a
judge results customarily in imprisonment; but the courts are not likely
to uphold an administrative equivalent of "Ten dollars fine-or ten days
in jail";
(8) Collection of true penalties by summary devices such as distraint
will probably be frowned upon, except when supported by a strong
tradition such as that encountered in the revenue field, where penalties
related to non-payment or under-payment of tax will be collectible
accordingly. Payment of other money penalties will have to be enforced
through civil suits, except where pressure can be exerted through
administrative withholding of a desired status or advantage until the
penalty has been paid.Y
52. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), discussed in the preceding text.
53. See also Parker, The Execution ofA dministrative Acts, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 292 (1957).
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